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Constitutional Chrononomy
RICHARD S. KAY
Abstract. Every constitution defines and is defined by a period in time. Like all law
the creation and application of constitutions require reference to the past and future
respectively Every instance of constitution-making is an attempt to control behavior
over an extended period of time. Therefore constitutions will be drafted, both in style
and substance, to reflect that temporal ambition. The effectiveness of a constitution
also requires that its interpretation makes reference to the understanding of its rules
held by the constitution-makers. As a result, and notwithstanding the efforts to make
it suitable over a long period by its creators, every constitution is bound to become
unsuitable. Courts employ a number of devices to cope with the inevitable obsoles-
cence of constitutions but, sooner or later, every constitution will have to be dis-
carded and a new constitutional era begun.
The creation and application of positive law involve attempts to move for-
ward and backward in time. The creation of any explicit legal rule is a way to
specify, in advance, how some category of human conduct should or should
not proceed: It is a future-oriented act. By the same token, the application of
a rule of positive law-either officially or by the relevant private persons-
is a reference to that prior enactment; it requires consulting a decision made
in the past.
The creation and application of constitutions display the same character-
istics. This is, at least, true of constitutions in the modem sense. (And it is
partially true even when we speak of constitutions in the sense of an implicit
set of assumptions and values controlling state behavior-as might be
appropriate in the case of the British Constitution.) In this modem sense the
term "constitution" refers to an explicit formulation of fundamental rules for
a politically organized society. Such constitutions are a species of positive
law-of legislation (Michelman 1998, 64-8). Constitutions of this kind have
a special place at the top of the hierarchy of legal rules, but when viewed by
participants in the relevant legal systems, they are regarded as binding in the
same way that inferior and more prosaic legal rules bind. More particularly,
redress for violation of these rules may be sought from some kind of court.
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While in most modem constitutional systems special courts are designated
for hearing such claims, these tribunals act very much like the sub-
constitutional courts and, indeed, are largely staffed by judges drawn from
the ordinary judicial system (ECDL 1997, 11-3).
The creation and application of the law of the constitution differ from the
creation and application of ordinary law principally insofar as they reflect
the special purpose of constitutions. The particular aim of constitutional
enactment is to control the future behavior of the state. The premise of the
constitutional project is that it is possible to specify, in advance, certain rules
of state conduct which, when observed, will minimize the extent to which
the state is capable of imposing on citizens in unacceptable ways. This is
accomplished through two strategies: First, the constitution defines the
institutions and procedures required to effect genuine acts of the govern-
ment created. It constitutes in the literal sense. Second, the constitution
marks off certain substantive activities as forbidden to the government so
constituted (Kay 1989a, 430-1). (More recently we have seen more constitu-
tions adopting a third function. They set forth affirmative obligations of
the government as well as prohibited acts.) Both methods aim to confirm
power within acceptable limits, the latter directly, the former by requiring
decisions to be made with the concurrence of sufficiently diverse interests
as to make offensive conduct unlikely. But both of these aspects of a con-
stitution involve the creation and application of rules of positive law. The
latter class contains familiar rules of the "thou shalt" and "thou shall not"
kind. But the former may also be reduced to legal rules. In each case, the
sanction for noncompliance is that actions undertaken outside of the
processes specified or in conflict with the injunctions given are treated as
ineffective. Like all rules, their enactment supposes that future actors will
understand them and heed them. Their success thus depends on an atti-
tude that, by definition, respects the act of constitution-making, a particu-
lar historical event.
The actual processes of constitution-making and constitutional application
constitute complicated and ill-defined practices. I will treat them generally,
conceptually and, therefore, inevitably incompletely. I will discuss three
attributes of the linkage between constitutionalism and the passage of time.
The act of constitution-making requires an acute awareness of the inevitably
unpredictable course of future events in the period in which the constitution
is to govern. The act of constitutional interpretation and application demands
attention to that historical act of constitution-making. Finally the act of
resisting and finally terminating the authority of a given constitution will
involve a comparison between the past beliefs, plans and aspirations embodied
in the relevant constitution and those of the new society which it purports to
govern. There is, therefore, a chrononomic aspect to every constitution. It
marks out not merely a social, geographic and political space but also a
limited interval in time.




The central social function of constitutions is the prevention of a proven
danger-overreaching by the state. As already noted, the machinery for this
purpose consists of the specification of legal rules-rules of institutional
design, of procedure and of substance. In and of themselves the creation
and observance of these rules confine the state within limits determined to
exclude the most obnoxious exercises of state power. The judgment that the
state is in need of this kind of limitation is an implicit adoption of one view
of the optimal conditions for developing human welfare-the liberal view. It
supposes that human thriving is most likely to be obtained in a life that is
largely self-defined. The removal of some kinds of state interference with
individual action is, definitionally, the expression of a preference for individ-
ual over collective planning. The creation of rules of state conduct enhances
individuals' capacities in this respect. This results not only through the
simple withdrawal of the state from certain sectors of human activity. The
rules also provide a prior definition of the scope of permissible government
action and the manner in which such action may be effected. This definition
informs subjects of the circumstances in which they may and those in which
they may not act. They thus create some assurance that their actions will not
be (or are less likely to be) undone by unexpected public intervention. This
benefit of constitutional limitation is independent of the content of the con-
stitution. The constitutional specification of a more or less permanent set of
rules of state conduct makes individual planning possible. Even where the
constitutional restraints are few, the confidence that they will be observed
creates a reliable space for private action (Kay 1998, 22-4).
It is evident from this sketch of the purpose of the constitutional enterprise
that to be effective, constitutional rules must be relatively long lived. If a
central feature of constitutionalism is the ability it creates to predict what the
state will and will not do in relation to the projected conduct of individuals,
that ability is subverted if the constitution undergoes repeated changes. It is
true that there are some polities where constitutions have changed with
some frequency. There is a joke about a person who visits a Paris bookstore
shortly after the inauguration of the Fifth Republic to buy a copy of the
French Constitution. "I am sorry, sir," says the clerk, "but we do not deal in
periodical literature." The point, of course, is that there is an intrinsic incom-
patibility between constitutions and continuous constitutional revision.
The makers of constitutions, therefore, who, we assume are concerned
about this aspect of their task, will approach their work conscious that its tem-
poral span will extend into an indefinite but presumably long future. This
is sure to influence the resulting constitutional rules. Still, no constitutions
are likely to be drafted on the assumption they will operate properly over
an indefinite future with no changes whatsoever. Constitutions, therefore,
will make provision for their own amendment. The method prescribed for
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amendment, however, will take into account the need for long term stability.
It will make the successful adoption of amendments difficult. This is, in part,
a reflection of the importance of the constitution in the political and legal
system, but it is probably also designed simply to reduce the frequency of
constitutional change. An easy method of constitutional amendment is an
indication of a lack of faith by its drafters in the idea of constitutional
restraint. At a minimum, the procedure for amendment must be more dif-
ficult than that of ordinary legislation, since the legislature must necessarily
be one of the principle targets of constitutional limitation.'
The creators of constitutions thus work on the assumption that he rules
they establish will remain in place relatively unchanged for a long period of
time and that frequent amendment cannot be expected. Naturally these
enactors also understand that the world in which those rules will be applied
will not stand still. A central issue in the process of constitution-making,
therefore, will be how to draft stable reliable rules which will continue to
make sense in substantially changed circumstances. The objective must be to
write a constitution capable, as United States Chief Justice John Marshall
said while considering this very issue, of being "adapted to the various crises
of human affairs." (M'Culloch v. Maryland; [1819] 17 U.S. 316, 415). This
concern will manifest itself in three ways-with respect to the subject matter
to be controlled by the constitution, the content of the constitutional rules
chosen to govern that subject matter and the manner in which those rules are
expressed.
As to the first issue, the expected longevity of a constitution will be
reflected in a narrower range of topics subjected to constitutional control.
Perhaps the most alient way in which the reach of the constitution will be
limited is to confine its restrictions to the activities of the state. Historically
abuses of state power have been the most powerful stimulus for the creation
of constitutional limits. It may be that, as a practical matter, concentrations
of private power also pose a grave risk to a person's capacity for controlling
his or her own life. But the dangers of private power may be dealt with by
ordinary, sub-constitutional state regulation. Absent a constitution only state
power is immune to external legal control. It is the constitution that provides
such control, both in its design of public institutions and in the substantive
rules it lays out. It is possible, of course, to have constitutional rules that
apply to private as well as public activity and, in fact, such rules, whether
1 The Constitutional Court of South Africa refused to "certify" the amending provisions of the
proposed 1996 Constitution because they were inconsistent with the controlling constitutional
principle requiring that amendments be effected by "special procedures involving special
majorities." The Court said that this principle "makes a distinction between procedures and
majorities involved in amendment to ordinary legislation on the one hand and the constitu-
tional provisions on the other. Its purpose is obviously to secure the [new constitution], the
'supreme law of the land,' against political agendas of ordinary majorities in the national
Parliament." Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996(4) SA 744,
par. 153.
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express in the constitutional text or the result of subsequent interpretations,
have become increasingly common in modem constitutional law (Constitu-
tion of the Republic of South Africa, sec. 8(2); Currie 1994, 182-7). Such an
expansion of constitutional rules to private persons raises some particular
difficulties for judicial enforcement by creating the possibility of conflicting
constitutional rights, and by making the fashioning of effective remedies
more complicated (Fisch and Kay 1998, 451-8). The extent of these dif-
ficulties may be especially hard to forecast as they are projected further out
in time. This may be one of the reasons why constitutional regulation of
private conduct continues to be controversial and why it continues to be
exceptional.
The influence of the long term nature of constitutions on the second
feature, the substantive content of the rules propounded, is directly related
to the necessity of limiting the scope of the constitution just discussed. On
the one hand, the unforeseeable course of future events will caution against
too strict a definition of governmental powers. The creators of constitutions
will be interested in establishing a government that will be effective as well
as one which will be less dangerous. Therefore, they will be careful not to
hedge it in with limits so specific so as to disable it from carrying out, in
unknown circumstances, the large activities for which it is desired in the first
place.2 They will focus their efforts on the kinds of institutions and rules
most likely to maintain individual safety in the unknowable time to come.
This result follows naturally from the typical process of constitution-
making. The promulgation of a constitution, being an event both important
and infrequent, is generally thought to require an extraordinarily broad
political consensus in order to invest it with that legitimacy which will allow
it to function effectively over the long term. The need for such agreement
will necessarily reduce the number of propositions that are adopted. This
consequence will be more pronounced the more disagreement there is on the
large questions of the proper role of the state. Constitutions in such circum-
stances will be "thin"; they will concern only subjects which are relatively
uncontroversial. It is not surprising, therefore, that constitutional rules tend
to focus on matters of institutional design and procedure. It is easier to arrive
at what John Rawls calls an "overlapping consensus" (Rawls 1987) on long
term ways of dealing with substantive matters than on a more or less
permanent outcome for the substantive issues themselves. Again, this is
especially true in light of the impossibility of knowing how particular
limitations will work out as they are applied in new and unforeseen
situations (Hamburger 1989; Sager 1990, 951-2).
Furthermore, the long term perspective and the need for wide agreement
will move the constitution-makers to limit themselves to those restraints that
2 It is this insight and not, as is commonly assumed, the need for an expansive approach to
judicial interpretation, that underlay Marshall's dictum in M'Culloch v. Maryland ([1819] 17 U.S.
316, 407) that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."
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are generally believed essential for future safety. The choices in this regard
will be a function of both the substantive importance of various kinds of
protected activities and a historical judgment about what kinds of state
incursions are sufficiently likely that it is worth guarding against them.
Commenting on the rights guaranteed in the first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution, Justice Black captured this element of constitution-
writing when he insisted that the constitution-makers had not imposed a
"strait jacket" on state governments:
[1It is true [the rights specified] were designed to meet ancient evils. But they are the
same kind of human evils that have emerged from century to century wherever
excessive power is sought by the few at the expense of the many. In my judgment the
people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of Rights like ours survives
and its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and respected so as
to afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, devices and practices
which might thwart those purposes. (Adamson v. California; [1947] 332 U.S. 46, 89)
While the list of these substantive limitations will certainly differ from place
to place and from time to time, there has developed in Western societies over
the last two hundred years-the period in which positive law constitution-
making has become more familiar-a common core of constitutional rights.
These rights, whose genealogy may be traced from the English Bill of Rights
of 1689 through the American Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizen of the eighteenth century, to the Universal
Declaration of Rights of fifty years ago, center on protection of the integrity
of the individual personality, prohibiting assaults on the person (limitations
on arbitrary incarceration and on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment)
and restrictions on the mind (freedom of opinion, expression, religion).
While, as already noted, there is a growing tendency to expand this list to
include rights to minimum social and economic welfare, this has always been
in addition to the traditional negative rights mentioned. Whether, given the
problems of long-term prediction, the creation of positive constitutional
rights will be effective in achieving their purposes is a matter of some contro-
versy and it is, perhaps, too soon to make a useful evaluation.
The same considerations will influence the third aspect of constitutions,
the way in which the selected constitutional rules are expressed. More
so than is the case with ordinary legislation, constitutional rules must deal
not in instances of conduct but in categories. Constitution-makers, conscious
of the temporal dimension of their activity, will worry that the same evil they
wish to guard against may emerge in a somewhat different form. In this
sense they will share the motivation of the judges who refused precisely to
define common law fraud "lest men's fertile mind invent a new scheme
outside the definition but just as nefarious [...]." (Arkansas Valley Compass
and Warehouse Co. v. Morgan; [1950] 217 Ark. 161, 164). Consequently the
constitution-makers will choose to prescribe and proscribe at a higher level
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of generality (Hart 1961, 125; Perry 1994, 76-9). The common constitutional
prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" or on "inhuman and de-
grading treatment" provides an obvious example. Such provisions may
confidently be expected to apply to whatever new forms of torture tech-
nology may develop. But it will surely not be appealing to constitution-
makers to take this feature of drafting very far lest it undermine the essential
element of restraint at the center of constitutionalism. The point of constitu-
tional rules is to remove from the arsenal of state powers those actions
having certain undesirable qualities. If the categories chosen are too broad,
the result may be not only to inhibit unobjectionable action but to provide
colorable arguments that the vague terms of the restriction do not apply. A
prohibition of "arbitrary or oppressive" acts will be of little use to anyone.
Moreover, this kind of rule may increase the indefiniteness of the boundaries
of permissible state conduct since future applications may define the limits
of public power in unpredictable ways.
2. Looking Back
The creators of constitutions must speculate about the future in which their
decisions will be applied. Necessarily those who are then governed by
constitutions-the public actors to whom the rules apply as well as the
private persons who wish to know what those officials may do-must look
into the past in order to understand the content of constitutional limitations.
This, as already noted, is built into the definition of enacted law. In the case
of modern constitutions the most salient example of such retrospection must
be that of the judges to whom is committed (in most systems) the final
responsibility for deciding the meaning and applicability of constitutional
rules.
Notwithstanding this inevitable connection between the interpretation of
constitutions and historical inquiry, a large and respectable body of opinion
supports the idea that it is possible to operate a constitutional system with
little or no regard to the process of human deliberation that created it. In a
much noted lecture Justice William Brennan of the United States Supreme
Court said:
Current Justices read the Constitution the only way that we can: as twentieth-century
Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening his-
tory of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be: What do the words of the
text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability
of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. (Brennan
1986, 438)
This notion of a constitutional text as a "living instrument," changed in the
process of interpretation to make it more helpful in resolving contemporary
D Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
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problems, will be considered again in the next section. As the frequency of
appeals to it shows, it has an undeniable attraction. But a little reflection
shows that it is in tension with a central aspect of the enterprise of constitu-
tionalism. Constitutions exist to restrain public actions. Those actions repre-
sent the best judgment of legislatures or other officials as to what the public
welfare requires. As noted in the previous section, constitutions accomplish
this by specifying structures, procedures and substantive rules and these are
chosen with an awareness that they will be applied over a long future. This
exercise is nothing if not a judgment that the constituent decisions are to be
preferred to the subsequent official decisions. A constitution always being
"adapt[ed] [...] to cope with current problems and current needs" is no
constitution at all.
A somewhat different problem attends another attempt to extirpate his-
torical reference from the process of constitutional application. This is the
argument that it is the constitutional text itself that binds, divorced from the
particular historical act of its creation. This view which in its application to
both statutes and constitutions has been labeled "textualism" in the United
States, defines somewhat stricter limits for interpretation than the more
general "living constitution" model. The words of the constitution
themselves restrict the number of possible interpretations by limiting them
to those consistent with the standard definitions of the words of the textual
provision invoked. The dictionary from which definitions are to be drawn is
usually that in use when the language was drafted (Bork 1990, 144), although
some critics suggest there is no reason why courts might not exploit a
contemporary meaning which would have been unknowable to the drafters
(Schauer 1982, 831).
There are several problems associated with justifying this (partially or
totally) ahistorical understanding of constitutions. It would apply to con-
stitutional language a method of reading wholly at odds with the everyday
way in which we receive and understand both spoken and written com-
munications. Most of the time our object in such activity is to infer the mean-
ing intended by the speaker or writer. It is true that literary critics of various
modem and post-modern schools emphasize the variety of meaning that
may be extracted from any text, but in the practical affairs of life imaginative
reconstructions of the meaning of communications are fraught with danger
(Kay 1989b, 39-44). A legal enactment is an instrument for guiding behavior.
It would be remarkable if the sense in which it was understood were to be
determined by the inchoate possibilities in the particular form of words in
which it happened to be expressed.
This textualist understanding also raises problems that are especially
troublesome for the idea of a constitution as an a priori and relatively stable
set of rules for public action. This kind of interpretation definitionally makes
proper more than one meaning of the same constitutional text. As such it
makes the meaning of the constitution intrinsically uncertain and diminishes
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its capacity to draw the kind of assurance as to the limits of state activity
(and, as important, the boundaries of undisturbed private conduct) that
follow when we rely on the usual assumption that a communication has a
single meaning.3
Perhaps more significantly, the refusal to inquire into the specific meaning
attached to a constitutional rule by its enactors undercuts the claim of the
constitution to be regarded as authoritative. Like all positive law, a constitu-
tion's authority depends on the manner and source of its enactment. Usually
the authority of the lawmaker is a consequence of some higher level law
granting the enacting power. Statutes are binding because the legislature is
authorized to make law by the constitution. Constitutions, on the other
hand, are foundational in the sense that their creation is not the result of a
lawfully authorized act of lawmaking.4 But this does not mean that their
authority is not a product of the circumstances of their enactment. On the
contrary, as noted in the last section, it is generally believed that it is
especially important that constitutions be created through a process that
ensures the widest possible political agreement. Most new modem constitu-
tions are drafted in an assembly popularly elected for that special purpose
and then approved in a referendum. The continuing normative force of
constitutions is, at least in part, made possible by appeals to the solemn
decision of "the people" in creating them. In the United States, the actual
process of constitution-making (at the federal level) was far from democratic
in the modem sense. Still, praise of the two hundred year old text routinely
includes references to its status as the act of "we the people." More generally,
the legitimacy of a constitution-or any enactment-may not be divorced
from its historical origins. It is true, as will be explored further in the next
section, that no constitution can be effective unless there is some minimum
fit between its provisions and the prevailing values of a society at the time it
is invoked. But, by itself, this is insufficient. An acceptable set of constitu-
tional rules that is found under a rock will never command the allegiance of
those whom it is to govern. There must be a further understanding that it
is the product of some shared purpose amongst a group of people who it
was, and continues to be, believed were the right people to make funda-
mental decisions for a polity (Raz 1992, 295).
Restriction to the meaning apparent on the surface of the language may make its meaning
more accessible. It makes impossible the application of an intended meaning not inferable from
the ordinary meaning of the words used. In that sense this technique is consonant with the aim
of providing clear and knowable rules. But ordinarily there is only a need to articulate a view
of interpretation in cases where there is more than one plausible apparent meaning. In such
cases, as noted, the textual approach causes more uncertainty than certainty. The situations
where a single apparent meaning will differ from the historical meaning are likely to be few. In
most such cases the enactors' mistake in expressing their intentions will be more or less obvious.
Consequently it will be only on the rarest of occasions that it will be necessary to apply a
meaning which is undiscoverable from an inspection of the text (Kay 1996, 336).
' Such authorization, at any rate, need not be the effective source of the constitution's normative
force (Hart 1970).
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If this is accepted, the idea that one may invoke the authority of the
constitution for a decision that may be derived from one superficial reading
of its words, but which has no connection with the purposes of its creators,
is insupportable. Such an approach cuts the constitution off from its critical
source of legitimacy. The constitutional text in such a situation becomes
indistinguishable from any other set of rules that might be proposed. It
would, that is, be like the constitution found under a rock just mentioned.
The fact that it had the same words as the historically legitimate constitution
would be a mere accident.
It follows, therefore, that there is a necessary historical component in the
application and interpretation of a constitution. When the question is whether
a given action is permitted by the constitution, the interpreter will have
to ask whether it is one of those things intended to be permitted or pro-
hibited by the enactors when they made the constitution. Such an inquiry
will have to concern itself with the kinds of issues present to the minds of the
enactors and the political and social values they held. This will often be a
daunting task and it will become more difficult as the time between the
promulgation of the constitution and the moment of application increases.
Since we have already concluded that constitutions must be long term
propositions, it follows that constitutional interpretation will be an inexact
and controversial practice.
It will, however, appear somewhat easier when we recall that the
constitution-makers themselves, conscious of the special character of their
creation, must be presumed to have been drafting and enacting for the long
term. Thus we will be less willing to attribute to them an intention to deal
with narrowly defined objects of regulation rather than with more broadly
defined evils. It will ordinarily be unnecessary to ferret out the precise tech-
niques they had in mind for dealing with particular problems because, as
noted in the previous section, we can be confident they would not have
wished to hamstring the state over an indefinite future in order to address
questions that could well be short lived. Of course, this will not always
be the case. The uncontroversial meaning of some constitutional language-
the specification in years of an elected official's term of office or the legisla-
tive majorities necessary for different kinds of decision-indicates that
sometimes the constitutional enactors will choose to define conduct with
considerable precision. A much discussed issue in the literature of con-
stitutional interpretation addresses the "level of generality" with which
constitutional rules should be read (Dworkin 1981, 488-97). In light of the
indispensable need to refer to the decisions of the enactors already dis-
cussed, the proper response is straightforward. Officials regarding them-
selves bound by the constitution will inquire how wide or narrow a category
of conduct was intended to be regulated by the constitution-makers. Given
the imperatives of constitution-writing, those intentions will likely, although
not invariably, be to define the powers and limitations of government in
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such a way as to permit the state to respond to changing needs. But they will
also be to prevent the state from perpetrating the evils that concerned the
enactors, even if the specific conduct in which they were embodied was
beyond their contemplation.
3. Temporal Dysfunction
It is clear from this discussion that the great ambition of constitution-makers
is to bind the future to the values of the present. They engage, in Anne
Norton's phrase, in an attempt at "temporal imperialism" (Norton 1988,
460). It is equally clear that the great problem for this enterprise is the
inability to predict with confidence how the future will look and how the
human beings whose actions are to be controlled will respond in that
unpredictable time to come. I have already noted a number of techniques
that will be employed by sensible constitution drafters to maximize the
chances that their intentions will continue to be respected. Their success will
depend on a number of factors. First, it will turn on the degree to which the
enactors are capable of foreseeing the kinds of new facts that will emerge
during the period in which they expect the constitution to operate. Perhaps
more seriously, it will hinge on the degree to which the political and social
values that animate the making of the constitution continue to be widely
shared in the relevant society. To some extent this will be a function of the
wisdom and perspicacity of the people writing the constitution but it will
almost surely turn equally on luck.
There are limits, however, to both skill and luck. Human history tells us
that sooner or later every constitution will begin to chafe. The metaphor
most commonly employed to describe this phenomenon is that of the "dead
hand" (Klarman 1997, 381). It has two related aspects. First there is a
normative objection based on the presumed priority of self-government. The
great American lexicographer and essayist, Noah Webster, made the point
pungently during the constitution-making era of the late eighteenth century:
"The very attempt to make perpetual constitutions is the assumption of a
right to control the opinions of future generations; and to legislate for those
over whom we have as little authority as we have over a nation in Asia"
(quoted in Rubenfeld 1988, 1088). More particularly, however, it is inevitable
that urgent needs or intolerable evils will appear that were simply unfore-
seeable at the time of constitution-making. Moreover the ordering of social
values that informed the initial constitutional decisions may shift signifi-
cantly. There will then develop a misalignment between the constitution and
the social and political realities which any system of government must take
into account. A recent commentator put this point forcefully in the context
of the United States Constitution of 1787-89:
No matter how smart the Framers were, they still held slaves and subordinated
women; they could not dream of space travel, nuclear weapons and computer
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technology; and they wrongly assumed basic demographic, political and other facts
about the world. Greater wisdom notwithstanding, it is hard to justify binding us to
the Founders' constitutional commitments given the handicaps under which they
operated. (Klarman 1997, 388-9)
For reasons discussed, this is an unavoidable cost of constitutionalism. Every
constitutional system, it would seem, must respond one way or another to
this problem.
A number of reactions to constitutional misalignment, including amend-
ment and judicial revision, will be discussed below. But by far the most
common response may be to do nothing. The now obsolete constitutional
text will continue to be recognized and to have an effect in curbing state
action. The lack of fit with important social factors will, from time to time,
cause the enforcement of the constitution to impose undesirable conse-
quences. These consequences fall into two categories: First, actions of the
state that would be prohibited if a constitution more in tune with the current
realities were in place, will be permissible and, therefore, might be under-
taken. In democratically organized polities there will be a disincentive to
these acts independent of any substantive constitutional prohibition. But the
likelihood of their occurrence will still be higher than it would be if there
were an explicit constitutional bar. Second, and more probably, actions that
come to be seen as critical to social well being will be prohibited by the now
sub-optimal constitutional rules. But unless the cost of these constitutional
anomalies is severe, it will usually be more sensible to put up with them than
to undertake the difficult and traumatic process of full-blown constitutional
replacement. The framers of the American Declaration of Independence of
1776 expressed this wisdom succinctly in noting that "all Experience hath
shewn that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable,
than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accus-
tomed." (The Declaration of Independence, Par. 2 [U.S. 1776]).
Although every constitution exhibits an increasingly poor fit with contem-
porary facts and values, such constitutions will be tolerated until some issue
arises the importance of which justifies an explicit re-examination (Ackerman
1991). A significant constitutional misalignment can persist for a very long
time. In Canada the formal attributes of the 1867 Constitution, an act of the
United Kingdom legislature, maintained the constitutional amendment
power in the Westminster Parliament. For most of the twentieth century this
constitutional arrangement had little to do with anyone's understanding of
the locus of political sovereignty in Canada, yet this aspect of the constitu-
tion was retained with only minor inconvenience until 1982. It is only when
someone seeks to exploit the formal but outdated rules to effect a substantial
and concrete change that the need for constitutional reform will become
pressing. In Canada a change in the constitutional amendment rules
emerged only after the federal government, contrary to long-standing prac-
tice, attempted to secure a new amendment procedure and an entrenched
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Bill of Rights, by requesting an act of the United Kingdom Parliament
without obtaining agreement from provincial governments (Kay 1984).
Wholesale constitutional change can be forestalled for a long time by the
device of constitutional amendment. John Locke proposed a constitution for
the Carolinas which was to "be and remain the sacred and unalterable form
and rule of government [...] forever" (quoted in Levinson 1995b, 4). But
every modern constitution provides machinery for its own amendment. The
possibility of amendment cannot, however, prevent the eventual obsoles-
cence of a constitution. For reasons that have already been summarized, a
constitution must provide some minimal amount of stability and pre-
dictability-such qualities being at the center of the constitutional enter-
prise. Consequently, the amendment procedures must be designed to
frustrate frequent change. While it might be theoretically possible to design
a procedure which will be successful just at the point that the existing con-
stitution becomes inconsistent with widespread and lasting social attitudes,
it will more probably be the case that the kind of political consensus that any
amendment procedure requires will permit a small number of political
actors to thwart changes that are intensely desired by a distinct majority of
the population.6 When this happens the prior question recurs. What happens
when an unchanged-and practically unchangeable-constitution becomes
politically unacceptable?
The most commonly discussed response to this difficulty is for the heirs to
a constitution to refit it to current need through a process of interpretation,
most prominently judicial interpretation by the constitutional court of last
resort. I have already noted that constitutions generally are drafted so as to
extend to a variety of contingencies not foreseen or foreseeable at the time of
constitution-making. Judicial application of this feature of constitutions,
therefore, is not the kind of constitutional change at issue. It is rather an
example of how constitutions may be designed to avoid the problem of
changed circumstances. Judicial construction becomes a means of dealing
with the misalignment between social facts and fixed constitutional rules
only when it goes outside of the range of applications reasonably inferable
' For the same reasons states can endure for relatively long periods during which the practical
meaning of the constitution is sharply disputed between significant forces in society. See Foley
1989. See also Griffin 1995, 43-9 (disputed nature of the United States Constitution in the
nineteenth century).
6 The difficulty of constitutional change will be especially acute in a polity that contains a
significant and enduring disaffected minority that is able to participate in the amendment
decision. The Canadian Constitution makes it possible, although difficult, to effect most
constitutional amendments without the assent of the legislature of Quebec. But for the most
important changes the unanimous consent of all provincial legislatures is needed. Moreover the
federal parliament recently enacted a statute effectively preventing the federal parliament from
granting its essential assent to even "ordinary" constitutional amendments if, inter alia, Quebec
dissents. The result, given the arrangements of political interests in Canada, is that any
significant constitutional reform is, in the short and medium terms, pretty much impossible
(Hogg 1998, 69-99).
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from the constitutional enactment as intended by its creators (Levinson
1995a, 14-24). The common metaphor associated with this practice has
already been mentioned. It is the "living constitution." The obscurity of this
notion is captured in one of its most famous restatements when Lord Sankey
referred to the Canadian Constitution as having "planted in Canada a living
tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits" (Edwards v.
Attorney-General Canada; [1930] A.C. 114, 136 (P.C.)). If this process refers to
anything beyond the exploitation of the categories created by the original
enactors, it must amount o an irregular amendment of the constitution by
its interpreters.
In light of the purposes of constitutions I have assumed in this essay, it is
apparent that while such actions may successfully realign the constitution
they will also be subversive of constitutionalism in at least two ways. The
process of constitutional change through judicial reinterpretation necessarily
reduces the capacity to know the content of the constitutional rules that will
be applied to any situation. The ability to know what a particular rule was
intended to do may, in some cases, be difficult but it is certainly easier than
predicting the outcome of litigation, in which a court is seeking not to
discover and apply a fixed rule but to create a rule suitable to the exigencies
of the time. That task is necessarily made even harder by the fact that such
judicial activity is disguised as mere interpretation of a rule already present
in the constitution. Such covert rule making is unlikely to provide the
security that we seek from a more or less fixed definition of permissible and
impermissible state action. Beyond this, the rules that emerge from such a
process will lack the legitimacy that attend the constitutional rules made by
the broad and intense political activity that we normally require in the
course of constitution-making. In the United States the common charges of
usurpation by the Supreme Court are often associated with the fact that the
Court, unelected and vested with permanent enure, has ubstituted its own
values for those chosen by "we the people," acting through the constitution-
makers of 1787-89 (Perry 1999).
The experience of the United States, however, is also a reminder that, not-
withstanding its corrosive effect on constitutionalism, judicial action may, in
fact, significantly and successfully change the shape and content of the effect-
ive constitutional rules. While it is possible to overstate the extent to which
the original constitutional plan has been altered by the actions of the courts,
there is universal agreement that they have permitted, and sometimes im-
posed, very significant innovations in the constitutional scheme. These
include the vast expansion of the authority of the federal government from
an important but strictly defined sphere of operation to almost plenary
dimensions. Better known, although perhaps less significant in practice, has
been the judicial creation of entirely new individual rights, both economic
and personal, assertable against both state and federal governments and
connected to the constitutional text by little more than rhetorical fiat.
D Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
44
Constitutional Chrononomy
Though often controversial, these judicial revisions have been pretty
thoroughly accepted. It is thus accurate to describe the operative American
constitution as one which has been substantially changed in the process of
constitutional litigation. Yet the American example also illustrates the dif-
ficulties with this kind of adaptation. It is almost impossible to say just what
this hybrid constitution consists of, which judicial amendments are lasting
changes and which are passing experiments. Michael Perry has suggested
that the constitution must be regarded as including those norms created in
the courts that have become "bedrock" in our legal-political system (Perry
1998, 104-7). But time has shown that the identification of such norms is far
from foolproof.7 To the extent that we concede (and it is hard, at the end, to
deny) that constitutional changes may occur in this way, we have signifi-
cantly reduced, although not eliminated, the settling and securing functions
of the constitution.
The problems with judicial revision mean, among other things, that a
thorough reliance on it to resolve the problems of an outdated constitution
cannot be entirely successful. Constitutional amendment may, for good rea-
sons of constitutionalism, be unachievable because the particular arrange-
ment of political forces made necessary by the prescribed procedure cannot
be assembled. Modernizing interpretations may be refused because the
desired result is so much at odds with the text or history of the constitution
as to make even the most imaginative court uncomfortable. At some point
the constitution becomes incorrigibly unsuitable for the polity it is meant to
govern. At this point the only avenue open for dealing with the problem is
an explicit departure from the law the old constitution has established.
This kind of constitutional change need not be violent or even particularly
disruptive. What it requires is that there be a palpable departure from the
authority of the existing constitution. Arguably the enactment of the United
States Constitution of 1787-89 was such an event. Although there were some
feeble attempts at the time to explain its creation as a lawful continuation of
the Articles of Confederation or as authorized under some other subsisting
law, it was rather plainly a case of simply putting aside a constitutional
regime which was painfully inadequate to the political needs of the time.
"The house on fire," explained James Wilson, one of the most influential
founders, "must be extinguished without a scrupulous regard to ordinary
rights" (Farrand 1911, 469). But this extralegal replacement of one constitution
7 The constitutional economic rights invented by the American courts in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century were pretty much spent by the middle of the century. The changes in
the spheres of competence of federal and state governments have largely run in favor of the
former, but there are signs that even this may be headed for revision, U.S. v. Lopez, (1995) 514
U.S. 549 (Federal Statute prohibiting possession of firearms in a school zone, held to exceed
Congressional authority to regulate commerce); Printz v. U.S., (1997) 521 U.S. 898 (Federal
Statute requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on proposed
handgun transferees, held unconstitutional).
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with another was accomplished entirely through peaceful, although
unauthorized, procedures (Kay 1987).
There are certain advantages to changing constitutions through overtly
illegal means. The new dispensation, being the product of a different politi-
cal consensus from that creating the replaced constitution, will be able to draw
legitimacy from the events of the change. As I will mention below, there may
be some value in rooting the new rules to the events associated with the
creation of the old ones but sometimes, at least, the historical regard in which
those events are held may have become tainted by the discredited con-
stitution they produced. The replacement of the amendment rules of the
colonial Canadian Constitution of 1867 mentioned above was, at the end,
accomplished in a manner that complied with the formal rules in place. But
some of the participants in that event had argued for a process that was
explicitly alegal exactly in order to emphasize that the constitution was a
product of a solely Canadian decision (Hogg 1998, 54). The quality of the
constitutional rules created may also be compromised by failing to acknow-
ledge the break in legal continuity. The act of constitution-making they entail
should be undertaken with an eye to the special needs of this kind of law-
making discussed above. It will be harder to succeed in meeting these needs
if the process is disguised as mere subconstitutional change. Finally, a
transparently illegal action allows subsequent interpreters of the new consti-
tutional rules to place them in the true context of their creation. To the extent
the updated constitutional rules are represented as merely the continuation
of the pre-existing constitutional authority, their meaning may be obscured
in the attempt to reconcile them with that authority. Such confusion further
undermines the constitutionalist desiderata of stability and clarity.
When there are substantial elements in a society that remain committed
to the prior constitutional regime, and when there are no shared supra-
constitutional means for resolving such differences peacefully, only a contest
of force can effect the necessary constitutional change. When the resistance
comes from the official holders of power, the result is a revolution. A success-
ful revolution is the clearest possible indication that time has made the exist-
ing constitution unsuitable. It is remarkable, however, how often genuine
revolutionaries seek to connect their actions in one way or the other to the
artifacts of the legal system they are displacing. After the English revolu-
tionaries of 1688-89 had invited in a foreign army and induced James II to
flee for his life they reconceived his actions as an "abdication" and insisted
that his replacement was according to ordinary English law. When the
southern United States unilaterally seceded from the federal union of
1787-89 initiating the American Civil War, the President of the Southern
confederacy declared that their action did not amount to "any failure to
perform any constitutional duty" (Kay 1987, 167-82). While there are also
examples where such legal justification is absent, its fairly common occur-
rence illustrates the extent to which legal regularity may be seen as a
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fundamental value in the relevant society. The same craving for stability that
animates constitutionalism may make the appearance of some form of legal
continuity essential to generate the political acceptability even of revolu-
tionary change. It may be possible to acknowledge the break in legality only
after the new regime has established itself on a secure footing.
Whether disguised as lawful or overtly revolutionary, such wholesale
constitutional change must rest on its own political foundation. Whether the
substantive changes it puts in place are minor or substantial, it amounts to a
new constitutional founding. No matter how perfectly a constitution's rules
and institutions match the social and moral context in which it was created,
the inevitable movement of human affairs will doom it to anachronism.
Finally there will have to be a new beginning and the constitutional clock
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